

3. DURING A CONVERSATION AT A SOCIAL OCCASION AUGUST 15, SOVIET DIPLOMAT ALEXANDER V. MOROZOV TOLD EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER THAT "ABOUT TEN" SOVIET CITIZENS HAD BEEN KILLED IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE APRIL 1978 REVOLUTION. REGARDING POSSIBLE FUTURE SOVIET ACTIONS TOWARD AFGHANISTAN, MOROZOV [2 LINES ILLEG]

IN AFGHANISTAN." MOROZOV BLAMED HOSTILE [ILLEG] POLICY TOWARD THE DRA, ESPECIALLY THE CUTTING OFF OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, FOR CREATING "ANY OF THE DOMESTIC [2 WORDS ILLEG] FACING THE [ILLEG] REGIME. HE INSISTED THAT "[2 WORDS ILLEG] OPPOSITION" COULD BE HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION, [ILLEG] MOSCOW HAD FOR YEARS, AT AFGHAN REQUEST, HE STRESSED, [ILLEG] ALL KINDS OF ASSISTANCE TO VARIOUS AFGHAN GOVERNMENTS, AND MOSCOW IS NOW MERELY CONTINUING PAST POLICIES. MOROZOV CONCLUDED THAT THE PRESENT OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME IS "COMPLETELY IRRESPONSIBLE" AND DOOMED TO FAILURE SINCE IT IS BASED SO FIRMLY ON AN UNJUSTIFIABLY ANTI-SOVIET PRINCIPLE.

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E.O. 12812: GDS 8-16-95 (TAYLOR, JAMES L.) OF-P  
 TAGS: PEPR, PINS, FINI, AF, UR  
 SUBJECT: CLOW SOVIET OFFICIAL BASEDLY CONFIDENCE THAT YOU  
 WILL PROTECT HIS CITIZENSHIP HERE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO A SOVIET EMBAZY OFFICER, "AS OF YET" SOVIETS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN POST-REVOLUTION VIOLENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT MOSCOW WILL DO "EVERYTHING NECESSARY" TO PROTECT ITS REPRESENTATIVES HERE. THE SOVIET DISPLAYED TESTINESS WHICH COULD REFLECT GROWING PRESSURES ON SOVIETS SERVING IN THIS COUNTRY, AS THE ANTI-SOVIET INCIDENTS APPEAR TO BE BRINGING THEIR ACT EVER CLOSER TO KABUL. END OF SUMMARY.

3. DURING A CONVERSATION AT A SOCIAL GATHERING AUGUST 15, SOVIET DIPLOMAT ALEXANDER V. MOROZOV TOLD EMERGENCY POLITICAL OFFICER THAT "ABOUT TEN" SOVIET CITIZENS WERE BEING HELD IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE APRIL 1978 REVOLUTION. ESTIMATING POSSIBLE FUTURE SOVIET ACTION TOWARD AFGHANISTAN, MOROZOV

[illegible]

4. COMMENT: MOROZOV, GENERALLY ONE OF THE MORE AMIALE SOVIETS HERE, WAS MARKEDLY MORE TESTY DURING THIS CONVERSATION THAN HE HAS EVER BEEN BEFORE. HE RELIED TO A GREAT EXTENT OF STANDARD CANT TO DESCRIBE THE SITUATION HERE, BUT HE SEEMED CLEARLY CONVINCED THAT AMERICAN POLICIES HAD DELIBERATELY CREATED A SITUATION WHICH IS PRECARIOUS FOR SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS, AND DANGEROUS FOR SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN THIS COUNTRY. MOROZOV'S TESTINLESS MAY HAVE BEEN ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE HEAVY PRESSURES ON HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES.

5. MOROZOV'S COMMENT REGARDING THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN WAS MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF POSSIBLE DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION, AND HE SEEMED CERTAIN THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WOULD SEND TROOPS TO KABUL IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE NUMEROUS "ADVISERS" AND OTHER OFFICIALS HERE. WE DO NOT KNOW, OF COURSE, WHETHER MOROZOV WAS BUCKING UP HIS OWN SPIRITS BY SAYING THIS, OR WHETHER HE MAY ACTUALLY BE PRIVY TO SOME KIND OF SOVIET CONTINGENCY PLANNING. IN THIS REGARD, IT MAY BE WORTH NOTING THAT, AT TIMES OF VIOLENCE IN KABUL (E.G., JUNE 23 AND AUGUST 5), THE SOVIET EMBASSY COMPOUND, AS WELL AS THE RESIDENTIAL AREA HOUSING MANY SOVIET FAMILIES, ARE IMMEDIATELY CORDONED OFF BY AFGHAN ARMY FORCES, INCLUDING TANKS AND OTHER HEAVY EQUIPMENT, A MOVE WHICH STRONGLY SUGGESTS THE REGIME IS AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO SOVIET CITIZENS POSED BY THE INSURGENTS.

6. FINALLY, TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, MOROZOV'S FIGURE OF "ABOUT TEN" IS THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF FATALITIES THAT ANY SOVIET OFFICIAL HAS YET USED WITH AN AMERICAN OFFICIAL. WE BELIEVE THE ACTUAL CASUALTY FIGURE IS PROBABLY CONSIDERABLY HIGHER.

AMSTUTZ